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 
Abstract—A statistical, distance-based validation of highly 
automated vehicles is not feasible due to the high required 
testing distance. Scenario-based validation approaches promise 
to solve this issue. However, due to the high number of influence 
parameters, the number of possible parameter combinations is 
exploding. Therefore, exhaustive testing of all possible 
combinations is not feasible as well. Thus, a coverage criterion 
for scenario-based validation is required. Hereby, it is crucial 
that all stakeholders accept the coverage criterion. This paper 
proposes an approach to determine the number of scenarios that 
correspond to the required testing distance of the known 
distance-based approach. Furthermore, the number of scenarios 
that can be feasibly simulated for validation is estimated under 
certain assumptions. Comparing the required and the feasible 
number of scenarios shows that there is still a gap of around one 
order of magnitude. Nevertheless, combining this approach with 
other methods that aim to reduce the approval effort has the 
potential to get the required test coverage to a feasible level and 
therefore contribute to solving the validation challenge. 
However, there are still many remaining challenges, such as the 
availability of representative scenario catalogs or sufficient 
simulation models for environment perception sensors. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the major challenges for the release of highly 
automated vehicles (HAV, Level 3 and higher according to 
[1]) is their safety approval. First of all, the question “How safe 
is safe enough?” has not been answered in detail yet. Junietz 
et al. [2] propose to define macroscopic safety requirements 
based on risk acceptance of the involved stakeholder groups. 
They conclude that risk acceptance depends on the market 
share of HAV and is different for each stakeholder group. 
Starting from a 10 % market share, the risk acceptance of the 
society is dominant and requires HAV to be at least 1.3 times 
safer as today’s traffic. With increasing market share, the 
safety requirement increases as well. Liu et al. [3] state that 
HAV have to be 4-5 times safer than today’s traffic based on 
a survey study. In any case, it is obvious that HAV have to be 
safer than today’s traffic even if the exact factor is not known 
yet. 
Once a generally accepted safety requirement has been 
found, the next challenge is to prove that it is fulfilled by a 
specific HAV in its operational design domain (ODD). 
Especially if the safety reference is already on a high level of 
safety, statistical safety approval is not feasible. For example, 
today’s traffic on the German Autobahn is quite safe and the 
average driven mileage between two fatal accidents is around 
7∙108 km [4, p. 23, 5]. To statistically prove that a HAV, that 
is assumed to be twice as safe as its reference, is in fact safer 
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than this reference, the reference distance has to be driven ten 
times according to Wachenfeld and Winner [6].  
A scenario-based approach promises to solve this approval 
challenge. However, it introduces a new challenge, the so-
called parameter space explosion: Due to the high number of 
parameters, the number of possible parameter combinations is 
exploding. Thus, it is impossible to include all theoretically 
possible scenarios in the safety validation process. Therefore, 
it has to be defined and argued which test coverage is sufficient 
for the scenario-based validation of HAV. This is the focus of 
this paper. 
After introducing the scenario-based approach and related 
work, the remainder of this paper defines the required number 
of scenarios that correspond to the distance-based approach. 
Furthermore, it is estimated how many scenarios can be 
feasibly tested in simulation. Additionally, measures to close 
the gap between the required and feasible number of scenarios 
are proposed and finally the results and their shortcomings are 
discussed and open research needs are pointed out.  
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Scenario-based Approach 
Schuldt et al. [7] motivate a scenario-based validation 
approach for HAV, which is also the subject of various 
research projects [e.g. 8–10]. The main idea behind this 
approach is to generate relevant scenarios intentionally in 
simulations or on proving grounds rather than waiting until 
they randomly occur in public traffic. Relevant scenarios are 
all scenarios that can occur within the ODD and are 
challenging for the HAV and therefore might cause failures 
[11].  
 Ulbricht et al. [12] define the term scenario as following: 
“A scenario describes the temporal development between 
several scenes […] Actions & events as well as goals & values 
may be specified to characterize this temporal development in 
a scenario. Other than a scene, a scenario spans a certain 
amount of time.” 
Bagschik et al. [13] propose a 5-layered model for scene 
description that is adapted from [14]. Menzel et al. [15] define 
three levels of detail for the description of scenarios: The most 
detailed level are concrete scenarios that are described by a 
concrete parameter set and can be transferred to test cases. 
Logical scenarios use parameter ranges for the description 
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while functional scenarios use a semantic description in 
natural language.  
Scenarios can be extracted from existing data such as field 
operational tests (FOT), natural driving studies (NDS) or 
accident databases by criticality metrics [e.g. 11, 16] or can be 
artificially generated with different approaches [e.g. 13, 17–
20]. A central database to store relevant scenarios is proposed 
in [21]. 
B. Parameter Space Explosion  
As a multitude of N parameters 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1 … 𝑁} is needed 
to describe a scenario unambiguously and each parameter can 
take vi different values, the number of possible combinations 
within the parameter space is exploding. N hereby depends on 
the complexity of the scenario and the detail level of its 
description while vi depends on the parameter range and its 
discretization. According to Grindal et al. [22], the resulting 
size of the parameter space 𝑆𝑁, i.e. the number of all possible 
parameter combinations, can be calculated as follows: 
 𝑆𝑁 = ∏ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  
Table 1 summarizes the values for N and SN of some 
parameter spaces for logical scenarios available in literature. 
These examples show the broad ranges for N and SN. 
Considering the fact that each of the examples represents only 
one single logical scenario, it becomes obvious that exhaustive 
testing (ET, i.e. testing all possible scenarios) is not feasible 
[23, 24]. The parameter space explosion is analyzed in more 
detail in [25].  
C. Combination Strategies and Random Sampling 
As ET is not feasible for complex systems such as HAV, 
systematic combination strategies are required to generate test 
suites. Grindal et al. [22] give an overview of different 
combination strategies. An alternative to combination 
strategies are random sampling methods such as Monte-Carlo-
Simulation. Arcuri and Briand [24] compare combination 
strategies and random sampling for the detection of interaction 
faults, i.e. faults that are caused by a combination of interacting 
parameters that are typical for complex systems [26]. They 
conclude that random sampling 
TABLE I.  EXAMPLES FOR THE PARAMETER SPACE EXPLOSION 
Reference Type of Scenario Number of 
Parameters 
N 
Number of 
possible 
combinations 
SN 
[27, Annex F] 
example scenario 
for SOTIF safety 
analysis 
8 2 ∙107 
[28] 
test scenario for a 
lane departure 
warning (LDW) 
16 3 ∙108 
[25] 
exemplary 
Autobahn scenario 
“following” 
18 4 ∙1018 
[25] 
examplary 
Autobahn scenario 
“swiss scenario” 
33 8 ∙1030 
may outperform combination strategies for high values of N.  
However, if constraints among the parameters exist, which is 
the case for the validation of HAV (e.g. there is a constraint 
between velocity and curvature), combination strategies have 
an advantage over random sampling as the constraints can be 
included in the combination strategies.  
Both, random sampling methods and combination 
strategies, have in common that either the total number of 
required test cases or a coverage criterion is required as input 
for the algorithms. 
A commonly used criterion for test coverage is t-wise 
coverage, which is defined by [22] as following: 
For t-wise coverage “[…] every possible combination of 
all […] values of t parameters [has to] be included in at least 
one test case in the test suite.” 
According to [25], the size of a test suite that follows the t-
wise criterion is  
 𝑆𝑡 = ∏ max𝑖(𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑁) 
𝑡
𝑖=1 . 
Here, maxi (𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑁) is defined as the i-greatest element of 
the set (𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑁). 
III. REQUIRED TEST COVERAGE 
One crucial part of the approval process for HAV is the 
safety argumentation. In order to reach a general acceptance 
and confidence, it has to be argued that the performed approval 
is correct and sufficient to prove that the HAV is safe enough. 
This argumentation would already be a challenge for ET as the 
detail level of scenario description (i.e. the number of 
parameters that describe a scenario) and parameter 
discretization are more or less arbitrarily chosen. Nevertheless, 
they have a huge influence on the size of the parameter space. 
As ET is not feasible, the argumentation becomes even more 
difficult. For t-wise coverage, the sufficient value for t has to 
be chosen, which is – in software testing - typically done based 
on empirical data analysis [26]. However, for HAV there are 
not enough data available yet to perform empirical analyses. 
And data of today’s traffic are not directly transferable for 
HAV as they do not behave similarly to human drivers in all 
circumstances. For example, we assume HAV would drive 
more defensive than most human drivers and therefore will 
stimulate more cut-in maneuvers. The same problem emerges 
when defining threshold values for criticality metrics, which 
are not necessarily the same for HAV and human drivers. 
Additionally, the application of a criticality metric includes the 
simulation of the scenarios to be examined and is therefore as 
time-consuming as using the scenarios for simulation-based 
validation. For other test suite generation methods such as 
randomly distributed test suites (e.g. Monte Carlo 
experiments), the required test coverage has to be defined and 
argued to be valid as well. 
As there is – to the best knowledge of the authors – 
currently no method existing that specifies the required test 
coverage for scenario-based validation of HAV, the distance-
based, statistical approach proposed by Wachenfeld and 
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Winner [6] as well as Kalra and Paddock [29] is transferred to 
the scenario-based approach.  
As an example for the following considerations, we use an 
HAV to be driven on the German Autobahn. Therefore, the 
average distance between two fatal accidents on the Autobahn 
is used as safety reference, as it is the rarest (and therefore most 
difficult to prove) and most severe accident type. In 2017, 356 
fatal accidents occurred on the Autobahn [4, p. 23] while the 
total driven distance was 246 billion kilometers [5]. This leads 
to a reference distance of ?̅?ref ≈ 7 ∙ 10
8 km. In order to 
transfer this distance to a reference number of concrete 
scenarios 𝑛ref, we need to estimate the average distance that is 
covered by one scenario ?̅?sc. Therefore, we assume the average 
timely duration of one scenario τ̅sc as well as the average 
velocity ?̅?sc: 
 ?̅?sc = 𝜏s̅c ∙ ?̅?sc (3) 
In our example we assume 𝜏s̅c ≈ 7.5 s and ?̅?sc ≈ 30 
m
s
. Thus, 
we get ?̅?sc ≈ 225 m. 
However, as the dividing line between two consecutive 
scenarios cannot be clearly specified (e.g. the transition 
between lane change and following is fluent) there is some 
overlap between two consecutive scenarios. Thus, we 
introduce an overlap factor 𝑓o to calculate the total number of 
concrete scenarios 𝑛tot that is included in ?̅?ref: 
 𝑛tot = 𝑓o
?̅?ref
𝑠s̅c
 
As it is nearly impossible to estimate the average time or 
distance fraction with overlapping scenarios, the conservative 
assumption that there are always two overlapping scenarios, 
i.e. 𝑓o = 2, is made. Furthermore, the fact that one specific 
concrete scenario might be included multiple times in ?̅?ref has 
to be considered. Therefore, a uniqueness factor 𝑓u is defined: 
 𝑓u =
𝑛u
𝑛tot
 
Hereby 𝑛u is the number of unique concrete scenarios within 
𝑛tot. To quantify 𝑓u, a clear definition for the uniqueness of 
scenarios as well as an adequate sample of scenarios would be 
required. As both are not available yet, the conservative 
assumption of 𝑓u = 1 is used. With these assumptions, 𝑛ref is 
determined: 
 𝑛ref = 𝑓o𝑓u
?̅?ref
?̅?sc
≈ 6 ∙ 109 (6) 
According to [6], ?̅?ref has to be tested with a distance factor 
 𝑓d,95 in order to reach a significance level of 𝑒 = 5 %. In the 
case of an HAV that is twice as safe as the reference, this factor 
is approximately 10. Transferring this to our approach while 
considering the conservative estimations of 𝑓o and 𝑓u, the 
upper limit for the number of concrete scenarios that are 
required for the validation is 
 𝑛req =  𝑓d,95𝑛ref ≈ 6 ∙ 10
10. (7) 
Having determined 𝑛req, it can be directly used as a target 
value for the generation of randomly distributed test suites. If 
a t-wise test coverage is preferred, 𝑛req can be used to select 
the required value for t so that 
 𝑆𝑡 ≥  𝑛req 
is fulfilled. For the two last examples from table 1, the 
application of (8) would require at least 6-wise coverage, 
considering that the mentioned examples are not the only 
functional scenarios within the test suite. The size of the t-wise 
test suite 𝑆𝑡 hereby not only depends on t but also on the 
discretization of the parameter space (c.p. (2)). Therefore, t 
cannot be defined independently from the parameter 
discretization. Thus, the compromise between fine 
discretization and a high value of t has to be solved. A coarser 
discretization will result in a higher value for t and thus failures 
with a higher FTFI (failure triggering fault interaction) number 
can be unveiled [26]. However, a too coarse discretization 
might lead to undiscovered failures in the parameter space 
between the sampling points. 
IV. FEASIBLE TEST COVERAGE 
To estimate which test coverage is feasible, some 
additional assumptions need to be made. First of all, the total 
time 𝜏tot that can be spent for the validation has to be defined. 
We assume that one year seems to be feasible for 𝜏tot. As in 
the previous section, we use 𝜏s̅c ≈ 7.5 s. It is assumed that all 
tests can be carried out in simulation, thus we need to estimate 
feasible values for the real-time factor 𝑓rt and the 
parallelization factor 𝑓p. The real-time factor strongly depends 
on the detail level of the simulation and the computational 
hardware used. Herby, a realistic simulation of the 
environment perception with active sensors, such as radar and 
lidar, is the most computationally intensive and leads to low 
values for 𝑓rt around one in the best case [30]. With simplified 
or ideal sensor models, higher values for 𝑓rt can be achieved 
at the expense of reduced fidelity and validity. Those models 
are therefore not sufficient for all validation tests [31]. Thus, 
we assume 𝑓rt = 1 for our estimation. The attainable 
parallelization factor is only limited by the used computational 
hardware and could, in theory, be increased to infinity. 
However, this is not feasible in practice. We assume 𝑓p = 1000 
might be feasible as it lies in the same order of magnitude as 
the number of prototypes that are used for the validation of 
current vehicles [32]. With these assumptions, the feasible 
number of test scenarios can be estimated: 
 𝑛f = 𝑓rt𝑓p
𝜏tot
?̅?sc
≈ 4 ∙ 109 (9)
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V. CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN REQUIRED AND FEASIBLE 
TEST COVERAGE 
When comparing (7) and (9), it becomes obvious that the 
required number of concrete test scenarios is higher than the 
feasible one in our example: 
 𝑛req ≈ 15 𝑛f (10) 
Nevertheless, this seems to be a solvable challenge. The 
trivial but not most feasible solution would be to increase the 
parallelization factor 𝑓p and/or the total validation time τtot in 
order to increase the number of feasible scenarios 𝑛f. Instead 
of increasing 𝑛f, decreasing 𝑛req seems to be more efficient. 
To do so, the factors 𝑓o and 𝑓u have to be estimated more 
realistically rather than assuming conservative values as it was 
done in this study. Therefore and first of all, a representative 
set of scenarios has to be available. NDS recorded by drones 
such as the highD dataset [33] could be empirically  analyzed 
for this purpose. However, despite the fact that the data set 
contains more mileage and individual vehicles than 
comparable studies, it is still too small for a statistically 
significant analysis and as it only contains good weather 
conditions and a small amount of Autobahn segments it is not 
representative for today’s traffic in general. Furthermore, 
HAV behave differently compared to human drivers and 
therefore cause different interactions with other traffic 
participants. Accordingly, only the data recorded from drivers 
or ADAS that behave similarly to HAV (e.g. defensive 
drivers) are representative. Scenarios generated in complex 
traffic simulation toolchains as proposed by Hallerbach et al. 
[20]  can be an alternative to recorded scenarios. However, as 
all simulated scenarios, they bear some uncertainties and 
imperfections and the suitability for the generation of 
representative scenarios set has not been proven yet. Once a 
representative set of scenarios is available, a clear definition 
for the start and endpoint of a concrete scenario is required for 
an analysis of the typical overlap between consecutive 
scenarios. As a result, 𝑓o can be estimated more realistically. 
To define a realistic value for 𝑓u, a metric for the uniqueness 
or equality of scenarios has to be defined in addition to 
analyzing representative data. We propose the following 
definition: 
Two concrete scenarios are equal if their respective 
parameter combination is situated in the same volume cell of 
the common parameter space.  
As a threshold value, the cell volume of the volume cell has to 
be defined. This could be done with a sensitivity analysis.   
 Furthermore, the approach proposed in this paper to define 
a sufficient test coverage can be combined with approaches 
that aim to reduce the validation effort. For instance, the 
functional decomposition approach introduced by the authors 
in previous publications [25, 34] aims to reduce the approval 
effort by decomposing the driving function into functional 
layers ( see Fig. 1) that are tested individually.  
In addition to the potential to reduce the validation effort 
by a factor of around 70 (for 6-wise coverage, cp. Section III) 
as shown in [25], this approach can also increase the real-time 
factor as the simulation of environment perception is not 
required for all functional layers. Thus, combining the 
functional decomposition approach with the test coverage 
definition proposed here might lower the required number of 
test cases below the feasible number of test cases and thus 
overcome the parameter space explosion.  
 
Figure 1.  Functional layers and interfaces [25] 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a method to define the required test coverage 
for the scenario-based validation of HAV has been proposed 
and exemplarily applied for the first time. Using the average 
distance between fatal accidents in the ODD as a safety 
reference, an existing statistical approach for distance-based 
validation [6, 29] is transferred to scenario-based validation. 
With this method, the number of scenarios that are required to 
create equal evidence as the distance-based approach can be 
specified. However, to be successfully applicable for the 
validation of HAV, the method first has to be accepted by all 
stakeholders [cp. 2]. Furthermore, only the total number of 
required concrete scenarios has been specified so far. To use 
this approach for the validation of HAV, the distribution of the 
total number amongst different functional scenarios (e.g. lane-
change, following, approaching a traffic jam, etc.) and within 
the parameter space has to be specified as well. The probability 
distribution of today’s traffic can only be used conditionally as 
human drivers behave differently compared to HAV. Complex 
traffic simulations as proposed in [20] as well as empirical 
studies that analyze the interaction between human drivers and 
HAV in the ODD might solve this issue. Additionally, the 
limits of the validation parameter space have to be defined, as 
robustness tests require a certain amount of test cases to be 
outside the specified ODD.  
Furthermore, an estimation of the number of scenarios that 
can be simulated under given assumptions shows that the 
required number of scenarios seems to be feasible if additional 
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methods to reduce the approval effort are applied. However, 
this estimation assumes that all test cases can be carried out in 
simulation, which is actually not the case yet, amongst other 
reasons due to the lack of accurate models for environment 
perception sensors [30].  
We conclude that this work gives orientation on how to 
solve the validation challenge for HAV if all stakeholders 
accept the proposed argumentation. Nevertheless, there are 
still a lot of unsolved challenges as for example the 
development of sufficient simulation models or the generation 
of representative scenario catalogs. However, all of them are 
currently addressed within various research projects. 
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